The attempt of international donors to link their relief, rehabilitation, and development efforts in Chad takes place in a highly complex political situation. Internal Chadian politics is currently going through a phase of intense turmoil. The Government of Idriss Déby has been able to cling to power partly because of the external support lent by the European Union and France in particular. The rebel movements in Chad are, however, far from being defeated. The situation remains volatile. The regional political dimension is comparably challenging. The conflict in neighboring Darfur has sent sizable refugee populations across Chad’s eastern borders, while fighting in the Central African Republic is responsible for refugee influx across its southern border.

Following the events in Darfur, and the resulting troubles in eastern Chad, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1778 on September 25, 2007, which made provision for the deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission in Chad and the Central African Republic (MINURCAT). MINURCAT was supported by a European military force (EUFOR) in charge of providing security for the zones in which humanitarian workers operate, particularly the camps, until early 2009.

As in the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, and Afghanistan, both the European Commission and the United States Government are faced with the difficult choices to be made in Chad about civil-military cooperation and the degree of integration of their humanitarian and development assistance schemes.

This Chad case study is based on the findings of a series of field missions undertaken by Groupe URD. Groupe URD met the principal actors in the European Commission (DG ECHO, RELEX, AIDCO, DG Development, the Special Representative of the European Union Office for Sudan and eastern Chad), representatives of Member States and NGOs involved in Chad, the informal Group of Donors in Geneva and staff at the headquarters of EUFOR. Representatives of American agencies such as Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) were met in the field and subsequent communication took place via email.

The Chad case study illustrates a wealth of issues related to efforts of linking relief, rehabilitation, and development (LRRD). To facilitate engagement in more long term activities, an international military presence like MINURCAT or EUFOR may be needed. Once this is assured, however, the line between military and civilian actors gets blurred and contributes to decreasing humanitarian space. Furthermore, in a complex situation of mass displacement, donors and implementing agencies need to take great care to engage in sound socio-economic analysis to understand the urbanization processes linked to pendulum population movements.
Related to this, humanitarian and development donors promoting LRRD need to ease imbalances in service provision between host populations, refugees and the internally displaced. Without due diligence in this respect, international assistance can create more harm than necessary. The European Commission and the United States as the largest humanitarian donors worldwide carry particular responsibilities in assuring this.

Section 2 of this case study presents a short description of the socio-political and humanitarian situation in Chad and provides insights on the situation of refugees, internally displaced persons, and host populations. Section 3 takes a closer look at the assistance strategies of the European Commission and the U.S. Government in the southern and eastern parts of Chad. Section 4 shows the wealth of partners involved in providing humanitarian and development assistance: The Chadian State, the UN, NGOs, and the UN peacekeeping mission. Section 5 discusses a number of hurdles to linking relief, rehabilitation, and development in Chad and section 6 draws conclusions for donors.

**Complex Politics and Dire Needs**

On both a regional and national level, the dynamics of the situation in Chad and its potential repercussions in humanitarian terms pose a significant challenge to donors such as the European Commission and the U.S. Government. Chad is adjacent to the unstable areas of Darfur and the Central African Republic, shares a border with Libya, has oil reserves and is extremely unstable.

**Pressure on Natural Resources**

Chad is a vast and scarcely populated country. The north is very arid, while the south is more humid. Accordingly, agriculture in the south has a higher percentage of crops which need a great deal of water (such as cotton) as they flourish in the more humid conditions, and livestock farming is more productive. Between the dry north and the humid south is a transition zone where, for more than a decade, a worrying level of environmental degradation has rapidly taken hold. This degradation is the result of a number of different factors including:

- Population increase and therefore pressure on resources due to a rise in total surface area of cultivated land, rise in livestock, and increased pressure on grazing land;

- Over-use of water in Lake Chad, causing a decrease in the surface area of flooded farming land when the water level drops, as well as a dramatic decrease in halieutic resources;

- Patterns of desertification, as animals increasingly move further south to graze on fertile land in the rainy season. This pattern is causing tension between different groups that compete with one another over the same resources.

Development in Chad is mainly a rural issue, but it is dependent on urban and international markets, and consequently on the lifting of trade barriers affecting agricultural products. The condition of roads in rural Chad is poor, and the links between the capital, the east and the
north of the country are extremely difficult. The only tarmac roads leads to the south, where there are oilfields run by American companies. Added to these constraining factors is the fact that the short-term economic outlook is grim. Not enough jobs are being created in urban areas to compensate for the crisis in the rural economy.

**A Complex and Shifting Political Landscape**

The context for humanitarian and development assistance in Chad, particularly in the periphery zones, demands a certain sensitivity with regard to regional and national politics. One of the most complex and sensitive issues is the ethno-linguistic factor. Even though the south is economically strong (cotton production, cereal, livestock, fruit, and more recently, oil), its political influence on the national stage remains relatively weak. It is evident that the same competition that exists for resources in the pastoral and agrarian economies of the region is present at political and economic levels.

Chad shows all the characteristics of a fragile state, notably fundamental problems of governance, deeply flawed democratic processes and rampant corruption. During colonial and post-colonial conflicts in Chad, armed opposition groups played political power games, exploiting existing conflictual relationships (often based on ethnic or community allegiances) in order to further their cause. Faced with a strong regime, the emergence of a democratic opposition is slow and complex. International observers noted numerous irregularities during the last elections. The current political opposition is involved in a negotiation process with the current Government (known as the Inter-Chadian Agreement of 13 August 2007, which is sponsored by the European Commission), but that process has been undermined and weakened by ever-changing political alliances, and therefore continues to lack credibility.

Instability is exacerbated by regional tensions, involving for example Sudan and the Central African Republic. As in Sudan, the existence of oil in Chad could potentially worsen the situation. At a sub-regional level, there is a clash between French and English speaking areas.

**The Humanitarian Situation**

**A Contiguum Situation**

With some zones in acute crisis, others in a state of protracted crisis, and other areas apparently stabilizing and improving, Chad represents a typical case of “contiguum,” a context in which a wide variety of different situations exist at the same time. Since 2003, Chad has taken in more than 300,000 refugees from Sudan and the Central African Republic and has seen approximately 180,000 persons displaced internally. These population movements have been spread out over a number of years, and have followed different patterns. However, three main phases can be identified, with some degree of overlap between them:

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1 See Chapter 8.
- The acute crisis phase in which the first significant wave of refugees from Sudan and the Central African Republic, as well as internal displacement of Chadians, saw the creation of provisional camps all along the border with Sudan and the Central African Republic.

- The stabilization phase, as the crisis continued, with no solution resolving the causes of the crisis (conflict in Darfur and Central African Republic, tensions in Chad).

- The adaptation phase, requiring the management of unforeseen humanitarian emergencies. This phase included further displacement and urbanization. Some returns were noted, particularly to Sudan and the Central African Republic, as well as to villages within Chad. During this phase some Chadians were also displaced in the opposite direction, into Darfur.

During the second and third phases, the conflict resurfaced again, with new refugees from the Central African Republic arriving in the Grand Sido zone in the south. Further internal displacement also occurred following high levels of violence during the Tierno and Marena events in 2007.
Balancing the Needs of Refugees, Displaced Persons and the Host Population

Refugee Assistance

The mechanisms for refugee assistance in Chad are relatively well established. The past experience of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and its partners has enabled a significant level of assistance to be set up in Chad. Bearing in mind that the two crises which have produced the majority of refugees in Chad are far from resolved, the current situation is unlikely to change dramatically in the foreseeable future.

Among donors in Chad, there is intense debate about LRRD. Refugee self-sufficiency and their possible integration into the existing socio-economic context, as well as their access to basic services, are key in the analysis of the refugees from the Central African Republic in the south. The situation of the Sudanese refugees is still too volatile to consider a permanent integration into Chadian society. It is also important to remember that a number of Chadian refugees have crossed the border in the other direction, into Sudan—the issues surrounding their assistance, their return to Chad and the problem of their land now being occupied, must also be taken into account.

Displaced Persons and Return to their Homeland/ Regions of Origin

From 2004 onwards, the creation of Sudanese refugee camps in Chad accentuated competition over resources and brought about a series of violent incidents targeting Chadian villagers, which led to the first wave of internally displaced persons. In addition to these external factors, conflicts within Chad have heightened the crisis and caused further displacement. From 2007 onwards, it has been noted that a number of internally displaced persons have in fact moved back to their regions of origin, often only to be displaced again later. This “pendulum” form of movement is especially pronounced in zones where the land was cultivated and accessible, or where it is protected by natural boundaries during the rainy season (Wadi Kaja, Bar Azhum). The current patterns of movement, following the arrival of EU and UN peacekeeping forces, are at the heart of inter-agency discussions. It seems clear that humanitarian assistance plays a potentially important role in the choice of sites. At the same time, populations saw that food assistance was randomly distributed following numerous problems supplying sites for displaced persons between the end of 2007 and the beginning of 2008 and realized to what extent it was important not to be completely reliant on it. While the debate originally centered on the question of whether to accompany or encourage returns, it is now focused on the “when” and “how.”

Host Population and Victims Indirectly Affected by Instability

Camps for refugees and displaced persons have generally been established either on the outskirts of villages and small towns or on land designated in coordination with local authorities. The difference in treatment given to refugees, displaced persons and the host community, as well as competition for resources caused by the high population density could potentially lead
Box 1. Selected Factors Conducive to Refugee Self-Sufficiency in Southern Chad

**Population is homogenous.** Refugees from the Central African Republic have multiple ties with the resident population in the south of Chad such as ethnic allegiance (Mbaï, Kaba, Peul, Arab, etc) or even family ties on both sides of the border.

**Resources are not overstretched.** The region is well-suited to both crop and livestock farming, and has the capacity to absorb the demographic pressure caused by the refugees that have settled in the area.

**Mechanisms for sharing and distributing farming and pastoral land function.** With the exception of the refugees in Amboko Camp (where access to farming land is limited as the camp is surrounded by a nature reserve), Central African Republican refugees are able to acquire farming land. This can be done in two ways: Either it is granted by the local authorities or the refugees negotiate directly with the local population, via a committee system (consisting of refugees and local population) or individually.

**Voluntary return of refugees is not currently feasible.** Though there is a strong possibility that Central African refugees will have to spend a number of years in Chad, permanent integration into the local Chadian community is not yet envisaged.

**The process of self-sufficiency which was initially launched by the refugees themselves is now starting to be supported by UNHCR and NGOs.** This includes negotiations over farmland, small income-generating projects (trading, local handicrafts etc), and supply of farming materials.

to tension in southern and eastern Chad. In the south, these questions have given rise to the approach of refugee self-sufficiency and integration in the socio-economic context. In the east, this crucial issue has only recently been taken into account, and very few programs actually try to reduce the risks incurred by these differences in treatment between the three groups.

**Towards Refugee Self-Sufficiency**

“Donor fatigue” has hit the protracted low-level humanitarian crisis in the south of the country, where an LRRD approach is needed. The UN (notably UNHCR and the UN World Food Program) has therefore had to progressively reduce its assistance to refugees in this zone, and has been forced to devise a new strategy for the south since early 2006. This new strategy consists of working towards refugee self-sufficiency so that refugees and displaced persons are able to take care of themselves both in terms of food security and access to basic services.

In eastern Chad, because this zone is directly affected by the crisis in Darfur, humanitarian action continues to be funded. The series of crises which have forced 240,000 Sudanese and 180,000 Chadians to leave their villages in search of safety are deeply-rooted in a variety of inextricably linked factors. These factors are analyzed in greater detail below.
European Commission and U.S. Government Assistance in Chad

Some donors, such as the European Commission, the French and the German development cooperation agencies, have been in Chad for a number of years, financing large development programs. The “Darfur effect” led to a significant mobilization of the big humanitarian donors, in order to cope with the situation in eastern Chad, while the south attracted much less attention. Recently, humanitarian donors have begun to give serious consideration to LRRD connected to the more long term challenges of protecting natural resources at risk due to the camps and sites, the issue of self-sufficiency and the question of displaced persons returning to their villages of origin. The European Commission has made a considerable effort in mobilizing significant resources for its LRRD program in the south and the “PAS” and the Stability Instrument in the east.

The European Commission has a significant presence in Chad with ECHO administering the Commission’s humanitarian programs; DG RELEX the Stability Instrument in the east; and AIDCO the LRRD program in southern Chad. Certain members of the EU with a long tradition of working in Africa, such as France and Germany, are also present. The United States is involved in various humanitarian programs run by NGOs, the UN, the Red Cross, and the Chadian Authorities, via OFDA, the Office of Food for Peace and the State Department Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration. Although Chad is part of the Francophone sphere of influence, its proximity to Libya and Sudan gives it wider geopolitical importance.

Box 2. Main Factors Affecting the Crisis in Eastern Chad

Cross-border geopolitics. The situations in Darfur and eastern Chad are closely related with cross-border support for armed opposition groups – Sudanese support for the Chadian opposition, and Chadian support for Sudanese opposition groups. On both sides of the porous border the same ethnic groups can be found, with the same problems of cohabitation and of managing property and land ownership. Similarly, there are often well-established links between political figures and armed opposition groups.

Chadian politics. Political developments in Chad are complex and sometimes difficult to follow, with changing factional alliances, based on ethnic and clan based allegiances. This is the main cause of instability in the region, especially in the east, where it has led to the proliferation of small arms.

Intercommunity factors. The populations in eastern Chad are diverse, which is a source of both tension and positive exchange between the communities. Relations between farmers and herders (both long distance and short distance pastoralism), between sedentary and nomadic groups, are highly complex and turbulent. Points of conflict which have been present for generations are now being accentuated by the competition for resources in terms of water and grazing land. The current crisis in Sudan further worsens these tensions.
European Commission

The European Commission is highly involved in Chad not only as a donor but also as a political player. This involves mobilizing nearly all the financial instruments available in terms of assistance, whilst the European Commission delegation in N’Djamena plays an active political role.

The European Commission delegation in N’Djamena leads a broad program of cooperation and development with the Chadian authorities, within the framework of the European Development Fund, which gives the European Commission a certain weight in terms of political dialogue. At the national level, it was heavily involved in supporting political dialogue between the Government and opposition parties during the process leading up to the agreements of August 13, 2007. Nevertheless, the renewed intense fighting of January-February 2008 has been a major setback. The confidence that the parties had in one another has been severely shaken and the dialogue has almost come to a standstill.

In parallel to this firm commitment in Chad, the Commission has been very involved in the attempts to reach a peace agreement for Darfur and South Sudan. The EU Special Representative for Darfur has also recently seen its mandate extended to the whole of the EUFOR zone, including Chad and Central African Republic. Recent interference between the Darfur and Chad crises shows the extent to which it is pertinent to analyze the situation at regional level.

ECHO, with its team of technical assistants in Chad, is one of the major actors, both at the level of analysis and coordination between donors and in terms of funding. In addition, a great deal of other funding has gone to projects in eastern and southern Chad.

ECHO has been active in Chad since 2004, when the crises in the Central African Republic and Darfur first overflowed into Chad, and refugee camps were set up in the south and east of the country. This involvement was reinforced when assisting displaced persons in eastern Chad. In 2007, ECHO supported its partners working in eastern Chad with funding of €30.5 million (€15 million for the Global Plan, €10 million for the food assistance budget line, and €5.5 million for the European Development Fund B-envelope assigned to ECHO). In the south, ECHO is primarily involved through its support for the UNHCR, which works through a network of implementing partners. The amount of funding allocated in 2008 follows the same pattern as in 2007.

It can be noted that assistance provided by ECHO is linked to vulnerability rather than the legal status of populations (displaced persons, refugees, host population). This approach is very useful to prevent imbalances and creates a conceptual framework that is conducive to LRRD, as host populations are no longer only considered to be the audience of development cooperation.

With its team of technical assistants, ECHO is very active in debates with NGOs, national authorities, the UN, and, more recently, with military and civil personnel deployed within the framework of EUFOR and MINURCAT. This lobbying role gives the European Commission a very strong position in debates concerning the crisis in Chad.
The Stability Instrument of DG RELEX

The Instrument of Stability is a set of tools for post-crisis and fragile contexts. It is being used to support the setting up of MINURCAT, more specifically to put in place the Chadian component of the police, which will ensure security in and around the refugee and displaced persons camps. It also supports the census process in preparation for the next elections. The funding involved is considerable and includes €10 million for the Integrated Security Detachment.

‘Program d’Accompagnement à la Stabilisation’ (PAS) in Eastern Chad

The PAS (Stabilization Program) was designed to stabilize eastern Chad. The program has the following objectives:

- Ensuring that Chadian displaced persons and refugees can move back to their regions of origin and stay there in the long term;
- Putting in place programs that ensure that the host population can benefit from the assistance allocated to that region, thereby avoiding further tension;
- Contributing to a smooth transition from relief to development, analyzing rehabilitation and long-term development programs so that the process of returns and reintegration is supported.

We must bear in mind, however, that the security of people and assets is a prerequisite for reaching the above goals. The necessary level of security can only be ensured through a process of dialogue, reconciliation and restoration of the rule of law in the region. With this in mind, it is planned that PAS should focus on:

- Actions supporting the return of families, and food security in the broadest sense, with the idea of local long-term development and self-sufficiency in mind. These objectives are in line with the Government’s policies on rural development and the fight against poverty.
- Rehabilitation of public infrastructure at the local level, within the framework of sector strategies, such as health, water and sanitation, etc.
- Supporting the rule of law in order to establish a minimum level of legal rules and guarantees, to prevent or resolve conflict, starting with the concept of respecting the personal living space of each and every person.

PAS is an ambitious program, which is attempting to put into practice a number of LRRD precepts. It was financed by the 9th European Development Fund and has a budget of €13.1 million (€10.1 million for eastern Chad, €3 million for north-east Central African Republic), to be spread out over a period of 72 months, divided into two phases: an operational phase of 48 months and a closing phase of 24 months.

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2 See Chapter 8.
It should be emphasized that the PAS is to become a major element in the stabilization policy for the east. This is due not only to the program’s nature and the fact that a significant amount of money has been invested, but also due to its institutional linking to the Presidency through the National Commission of Support to the Deployment of the International Force in Chad (CONAFIT). This organism has great political weight in supporting the civil authorities’ effective involvement in the process at every level of the hierarchy.

The greatest challenge will be to put in place a variety of activities which demand a tight schedule, while following the Commission’s strict procurement procedures, all within a highly fluctuating context. It is important to determine the possible scope for flexibility and to identify an appropriate monitoring system which will provide a certain level of reactivity.

LRRD Project in Southern Chad

The multi-sector program for the socio-economic integration of the local population and refugees in the Grande Sido area, known as the LRRD project, is a new initiative launched by the European Commission Delegation in Ndjamena. Planned for a duration of four years as a multi-partner project, this project targets the resident population in Grande Sido (total of 103,000 people), with a particular focus on refugees in Yaroungou camp (approx. 13,000 people) and the local population of the villages between Danamadji and Maro-Sido (approx. 40,000 people).

The overarching objectives of the project are, firstly, to improve living conditions for the local population and refugees in the Grande Sido area, and secondly to reduce the risk of insecurity brought about by local inter-community conflicts. In order to achieve this, the project promotes the socio-economic integration of the affected populations (locals and refugees) in Grande Sido.

The long delays in setting up this project have caused numerous difficulties for the actors working in the field with the refugees. This highlights the importance of donor coordination in order to avoid funding gaps. The lack of mechanisms to offset administrative delays has meant that several agricultural seasons have been missed. As a consequence, the refugees’ confidence in the project has suffered.

U.S. Government

The U.S. Government provides only humanitarian assistance to Chad. OFDA has installed a permanent representative in Chad, generally on rotation from the regional bureau in Nairobi. OFDA’s budget amounted to $8.7 million in 2007 and to $2.7 million in 2008.

The Office of Food for Peace contributes to food assistance programs of the big actors, notably WFP with a budget of $37 million in 2007 and $57.2 million in 2008.

The Program for Refugees and Migrations of the State Department, which supports UNHCR and the ICRC, had a budget of $42.7 million in 2007 and $34.5 million in 2008. It

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1 (001/ACT/FED/ACP-CD21/SUBV/01/2008).
sends staff on a regular basis to Chad, either in the context of routine monitoring visits or in the context of specific missions, such as missions from the ICRC Donor Support Group (as seen in February 2009).

The fact that the U.S. is engaging very little in more developmental activities is underlined by the weak presence of the Office for Transition Initiative (OTI) which only disbursed $118,188 in 2007.

It should, nevertheless, be mentioned that Chad is now undoubtedly present on the U.S. radar screen for several reasons. The interactions between the situation in Chad and neighboring Darfur are permanent and explosive. The risks entailed by the political situation in Chad might endanger US economic interests in the oil sector. In addition, there are worries in U.S. intelligence circles that the spread of Islamic fundamentalism could move from Sudan to the West African Sahel zone through Chad and Niger.

Chadian Authorities and Implementing Partners

National and Traditional Authorities and Their Relations with International Assistance

National authorities play an important role, alongside traditional authorities, in managing displaced persons and humanitarian and development assistance. Yet, even though all actors emphasize the commitment of the National Commission for Assistance to Refugees, it is not easy to give unconditional support to a government which is itself involved in the conflict.

A key element in any transition process is conflict management and the healing of past wounds. This implies a mobilization of both traditional means (mediation between farmers and herders, managed by the day and other existing mechanisms of compensation) and the establishment of law and order (the fight against impunity, defending the rule of law, setting up the police force and the judiciary system), which poses a major challenge in eastern Chad. An ad-hoc structure—the National Commission of Support to the Deployment of the International Force in Chad (CONAFIT)—designed within the framework of multilateral mechanisms, has been put in place with the role of coordinating and managing local conflict resolution. CONAFIT has been given a high degree of authority due to its proximity to top level government, and strong support from donors, notably the European Commission. CONAFIT should use this authority and link up with technical ministries, their representatives in the decentralized system, and the network of administrative authorities, along with the international actors present. Such structures are frequently established in post-crisis contexts (as seen in Sierra Leone) and are often demanded by donors seeking short-term effectiveness. However, in the long term, it is not clear if they simply create further problems as they work in parallel to line ministries. Usually they are put in place by the World Bank, so the Commission’s involvement in Chad is a departure from the norm.

In the south, the situation is less tense and the authorities therefore have a greater presence and are less focused on military questions. This context enables the local authorities to be more involved in ‘civil’ questions and in dialogue with humanitarian workers.
Coordination between the Chadian authorities and development projects is key to the LRRD process. While the European Commission supports this strategy in the implementation of its LRRD program in the south and its PAS program in the east, the U.S. is not involved in programs of this kind, as it focuses solely on humanitarian assistance.

The application of national standards within each sector (health, agriculture, water, etc) is essential for the LRRD process, in order to ensure that needs are met nationally and locally. In the water and sanitation sector, for example, numerous difficulties could have been better managed had knowledge been better shared. Technical knowledge acquired by the hydro-pastoral projects funded by the European Commission and various Member States (France, Germany), as well as the technical guidelines as indicated in the National Water Code and by the Director of Water should have been taken into account to a greater extent by humanitarian workers.

United Nations Agencies

UN agencies have been in Chad for a number of years, working on development programs, but their role has dramatically changed because of the influx of refugees from Sudan and the Central African Republic and the large number of internally displaced persons. It can be observed that emergency UN projects have increasingly taken priority over development projects, which are more difficult to fund. The double role of Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator has created numerous difficulties as one role is focused on UNHCR’s refugee assistance, which has been in place since 2003, while the other manages the activities of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), which focuses on internally displaced persons and populations affected by the conflict. OCHA arrived more recently than UNHCR and has attempted to put in place cluster working groups which are part of the UN humanitarian reform.

The system which is currently being established in order to manage the crisis in eastern Chad, with the Special Representative of the Secretary General and MINURCAT suggests that the mission is moving towards an integrated mission mechanism. However, there is a certain amount of doubt, among both the European Commission and the U.S., as to the UN’s capability to manage the crisis and the LRRD process. The highly conservative management of security, which often prevents UN field personnel from having any direct contact with local people, further contributes to this perception.

WFP has also encountered specific difficulties in terms of access and supply routes through Libya and Cameroon. The food assistance of the U.S. Office of Food for Peace program and the food assistance financed by the Commission have been directly affected.

NGOs

In this context of crisis and fragility, both the Commission and USAID have given priority to NGO interventions. While some development NGOs have been present in Chad for some time, the presence of humanitarian NGOs is a more recent phenomenon. They generally have highly motivated, highly committed, but often quite young staff. High staff turnover makes it difficult to create an institutional memory of past experiences and lessons learned, and to fine
tune analysis of this highly complex situation. Despite being equipped with substantial means and standardized procedures, it is only recently that humanitarian NGOs have started to take into account the long-term issues concerning the self-sufficiency of displaced populations in protracted crisis contexts and the issues surrounding the post-crisis phase. NGOs are usually highly dependent on funding from the UN and the big humanitarian donors, such as ECHO, OFDA, or DFID). Interagency coordination is still a relatively new concept for many NGOs, and the NGO Coordination Committee is finding its feet vis-à-vis the National Authorities, the UN, and the donors. More than a year ago, ECHO decided to reinforce its support for the NGO Coordination Committee, in order to have a strong civil society partner, considering the weaknesses of the UN agencies.

**The Red Cross Movement**

The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement does not have a significant presence in southern Chad. However, it is very involved in eastern Chad. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has a sub-delegation in Abéché, and a network of offices and mobile teams, and the Chadian Red Cross is also present. This network plays an important role in the refugee camps, in partnership with the International Federation of the Red Cross and various Red Cross Societies. ICRC operations take place primarily outside the camps and consider populations in troubled areas as victims of conflict rather than defining them according to patterns of displacement, or as sub-groups of particular populations. Both USAID and ECHO support the ICRC, which has proven to be one of the most important actors in these highly complex situations.

**MINURCAT—The UN Peacekeeping Mission**

Established in September 2007, MINURCAT’s main task is to provide security for the areas surrounding refugee and displaced persons’ camps. It quickly became clear, however, that the areas of origin of displaced persons were of equal importance in particular with regards to LRRD. To facilitate lasting return and the establishment of more long-term assistance efforts, these areas had to be secured as well.

Different tools are employed to enhance security. Certain types of violence like raids require a dissuasive response. The presence of the police and the Chadian National Army, as well as MINURCAT bases and patrols, helps reduce violence of this kind. Much hope has also been placed on traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution, involving the intermediation of Sultans and elders, intercommunity agreements, and systems of compensation), as well as mechanisms linked to good governance and the establishment of the rule of law.

However, the effectiveness of these mechanisms has been limited due to the size of the problem and the proliferation of small arms. A significant investment in terms of funding and time is necessary to re-create the appropriate mechanisms which would re-establish a certain level of social cohesion and confidence in the system. As part of an LRRD process, CONAFIT and MINURCAT could play an important role alongside sultans, traditional chiefs, local authorities and the Commission Nationale d’Assistance aux Réfugiés, subject to continuing
interest from international players. There is strong European Commission support for these institutions, and whilst support from the U.S. is somewhat weaker, it is nevertheless present, showing that there is a certain similarity in the approaches from both sides of the Atlantic.

The deployment of EUFOR and MINURCAT has once again brought up the difficult question of civil-military coordination. Humanitarian actors have clearly expressed their concerns with regard to this issue. Certain EUFOR national detachments conducted civil-military projects such as the Quick Impact Projects, which are similar to the work of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan. The fear that MINURCAT and EUFOR’s “humanitarian” actions will lead to the blurring of lines between civil and military actors, has often been expressed and discussed with the High Commander of EUFOR, OCHA, and various donors. ECHO supports efforts to clarify the distinction between its partners and military actors, particularly through supporting OCHA and the NGO Coordination Committee.

In this French-speaking African context, the U.S. has let Europe launch its military security operation, EUFOR, on its own. The traditional American approach in this type of situation is currently being reviewed and restructured within the newly set up U.S. African Command. This structure, which uses the “whole-of-government approach,” is under the auspices of the Pentagon. Until recently, the prevailing European approach has minimized the use of American-style mechanisms such as Provincial Reconstruction Teams. However, new developments in the field, such as the setting-up of Quick Impact Projects show that some EU Member States sending troops to EUFOR are tempted to enter more forcefully into civil operations. Though it is often reluctant to engage fully in UN operations, the American Government does in fact support the deployment of MINURCAT with a substantial contribution to its budget.

Hurdles in Linking Relief, Rehabilitation, and Development

Managing the Security Risk

Although insecurity is not (yet) problematic in southern Chad, it is one of the major constraints for humanitarian actors in the east. Security incidents, although rarely fatal, have been frequent. They consist primarily of acts of banditry (stolen cars and cash, attacks on NGO compounds). The armed opposition seems to want to avoid being the cause of security incidents which involve humanitarian actors, civilians, refugees and internally displaced persons.

These instances of banditry are partly linked to the appeal of resources injected into the system by humanitarian organizations. But the issues are complex and opinion is divided as to possible preventative measures. For the moment, NGOs are reluctant to make use of the military convoys which are offered by the Chadian Army and MINURCAT. This situation clearly makes it difficult to set up LRRD, as the process involves a great deal of time, as well as presence in the field.

Large scale attacks on Chadian towns, notably Abeché and Njdaména, are also part of daily life for assistance workers. Both European institutions and representatives of American assis-
tance institutions have had to evacuate part of their teams over the last few years. This obviously weighs heavily on programs and their implementation.

**Striking a Fine Balance—Needs, Resources, and Capacity**

Since 2003, the massive influx of refugees into Chad and the forced displacement of 180,000 Chadians has put pressure on natural resources in and around the camps, as well as on the financial and human resources of the Chadian Government. In this complex context there are many challenges, technical, tactical, human and economic, and neither donors nor the humanitarian community have the magic solution, though solutions do exist.

Both ECHO and OFDA are sensitive to the need to strike a balance between the needs of different types of populations, the natural and human resources available, and the level of field presence necessary before an LRRD process can be implemented. The level of access to basic services, notably food assistance, clean water, health and education, is much higher in the refugee camps than in the displaced persons sites, while very little money has been allocated to the people in the surrounding villages. Having done what they could to help the displaced populations when they arrived at the beginning of the crisis, they have seen their local natural resources like water, wood, and straw rapidly disappear. In southern Chad, this issue is at the very heart of the LRRD project funded by the Commission. This project, which supports the self-sufficiency of the refugees living in the camps, also takes into account the needs of the local population. It includes, for example, programs providing firewood for cooking and fuel-efficient stoves, thereby reducing firewood consumption, and replanting trees where refugees and internally displaced persons are present.

In the east, however, this issue is only beginning to be taken into account. It will have to be taken to a much higher level as the crisis becomes increasingly protracted, with little chance of a peace settlement in the short or medium term.

**Conclusion**

The European Union and the United States are not involved in the same way in Chad. While the European Commission is already very involved in LRRD projects in both the south and the east of the country, USAID is still principally involved in humanitarian response projects.

**Humanitarian Assistance, LRRD, and Donor Strategy in Chad**

Linking relief, rehabilitation, and development in Chad requires that the diversity of situations, the risks of negative impacts and the turbulence of the area should be taken into account. This requires investment, strong commitment from donors and competent humanitarian actors in the field. There is a very strong European presence in the country with a wide variety of EU and Member State tools involved. These are involved in development action (pre-crisis), humanitarian action and LRRD. The U.S. is only engaged with humanitarian tools. This shows how donors prioritize zones where they have influence. This could change if the U.S. military’s new African Command decides to focus on Chad.
**Between the Paris and the Stockholm Principles**

For the member states of the OECD and their associated institutions, particularly the European Commission and USAID, supporting LRRD in Chad brings two families of principles into confrontation: those of the Paris Declaration, including alignment, ownership, and coherence, and those of the Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative, including the humanitarian principles of humanity, independence, impartiality and neutrality.

As Chad is not a priority for USAID, it remains somewhat in the background, working with NGOs, the Red Cross and UN agencies. In contrast, the European Commission has chosen to become very involved in the management of political and security issues which are connected to the LRRD process. Therefore, while OFDA is relatively comfortable, ECHO, which plays a central role in defending humanitarian space amongst the Commission’s services, needs to engage in advocacy.

**Managing the Instability**

In these highly volatile regional, national and local contexts, it is essential for donors to enable flexible programs. Experience shows that USAID gives actors a great deal of room for maneuver in order to adapt programs to changes in context. Things are more complex at the European level. Although the presence of ECHO’s technical assistants makes it possible to adapt programs, the other EU budget lines remain restricted by the potentially rigid logical framework. As soon as there are delays and/or changes in the situation, serious gaps appear between the reality in which an LRRD project is being implemented and the initial situation on which the logical framework was based. It is absolutely essential that logical frameworks for this kind of project are regularly revised, but this is not easy to do with projects funded by the EU. USAID’s flexible procedures are much better suited to this kind of situation.

The Chad case study also illustrates the tensions residing between peacekeeping and LRRD. To facilitate engagement in more long-term activities, an international military presence like MINURCAT or EUFOR may be needed. Once this is assured, however, the line between military and civilian actors gets blurred and contributes to decreasing humanitarian space. The heated debates of the last years have not led to an accepted consensus yet.

Furthermore, in a complex situation of mass displacement, donors and implementing agencies need to take great care to engage in sound socio-economic analysis to understand the urbanization processes linked to pendulum population movements. Some of these may be more long lasting than short-term assistance may be able to deal with.

Related to this, humanitarian and development donors promoting LRRD need to ease imbalances in service provision between host populations, refugees and the internally displaced. Without due diligence in this respect, international assistance can create more harm than necessary. The European Commission and the United States as the largest humanitarian donors worldwide carry particular responsibilities in assuring this.