

Chapter 10

Democratic Republic of Congo: European Commission and U.S. Approaches to Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development

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In a region of protracted crisis such as North Kivu in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the challenge for the so-called international community of reconciling the realms of security, development and humanitarian assistance is daring. External support or intervention in this crisis/conflict is based on the assumption that this situation is unacceptable and has to be changed. This is why the international community intervenes. However, the conceptual logic and actual field-practice of the sizable UN mission MONUC and of development and humanitarian donors like the European Commission and the United States differ and do not necessarily go hand in hand. Whether they should is a subject of intense debate. The integrated mission structure that the UN uses in DRC to combine all its agencies and departments under one roof is criticized by some NGOs. According to them it blurs the lines between security, development and humanitarian assistance. For these NGOs, a clear separation of these realms would be preferred. The concept of linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD), however, calls for a certain level of integration through close cooperation of all actors. It aims at making pragmatic cooperation in protracted crises possible to deliver the best possible assistance to those who need it.

Based on 25 face-to-face, phone and email interviews in Goma, Kinshasa, Brussels and Washington D.C.¹ and an analysis of legal bases, regulations, strategies and policies, this study aims to find answers to the following research question: “To what extent can the European Commission and the U.S., as the most important donors of humanitarian and development assistance, promote good LRRD outcomes at the field-level?” The call for a link between relief, rehabilitation and development has been debated for more than a decade both in the U.S. and the European Commission. But progress has been slow and actual change on the ground scarce.

The study endeavors to find reasons for this. On a conceptual level there is an increasing wealth of strategies and policies stemming from headquarters in Brussels and Washington

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D.C. calling for whole-of-government approaches to crises in failed or fragile states. The conceptions of field practitioners, however, remain remarkably separated, an expression of the classic disconnect between field and Headquarters. This restricts LRRD promotion. Nevertheless, there are situations where insecurity reigns that make it simply impossible for both humanitarians and development workers to do their work. The current situation in North Kivu comes close to this. Apart from this, humanitarian and development donors sometimes follow opposing logics which makes complementarity difficult. When humanitarians are distributing food, they are not building up a base for sustained food security. When they are providing free health services, they may contradict development efforts to establish a self-sustaining health system based on paid services. These contradictions exist. The LRRD conceptual framework is thus no magic formula that has to be adhered to in all contexts. But it should guide and inform all humanitarian and development activities, lead to more flexibility in programming and budgeting, and provide an incentive for all to find the most pragmatic and most effective solutions to the crises at hand.

After a short description of the political context and the humanitarian situation this paper will provide examples of these conceptual and practical dimensions of European Commission and U.S. LRRD promotion. The study will proceed to examine the viability of LRRD in North Kivu, describe European Commission and U.S. activities there and will try to provide a detailed institutional overview of who does what where and when. It will show that examples of effective LRRD promotion exist—achieved sometimes on purpose and sometimes by accident—and illustrate the considerable room for improvement both donors have in this respect.

Political Context and the Humanitarian Situation

The current Congolese President Joseph Kabila Kabange won the national elections in December 2006 comfortably. President ad interim since 2003, the European Commission the U.S. and UN invested heavily in the election process and were eager to have a clear winner who would carry sufficient legitimacy. In North Kivu, he garnered the support of 90% of the voters partly because Laurent Nkunda, his biggest until his capture in March 2009, made sure that his constituency voted for him. Kabila, however, was unable to work constructively towards improving the socio-political situation in North Kivu. Nkunda thus seized the chance of the ill-conceived military “mixage” and “brassage”² process in 2007 to tighten his grip on the Walikale and Rutshuru districts. When all-out fighting resumed in August 2007, Kabila tried to crush the rebellion with military force but had to concede defeat by the end of 2007.

January 2008 saw the birth of the Goma accords and February the “Program Amani” which was imposed by the Government and brought Nkunda’s Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP) on board but sidelined it by including a plethora of minor rebel groups. They were included to spare Kabila the humiliation of direct negotiations with Nkunda. Fighting never stopped completely, however, and since 28 August 2008 North Kivu was at war again despite the substantial, but as usual understaffed presence of MONUC peacekeepers. The following months saw several unexpected developments. The CNDP nearly captured Goma and

² The integration of rebel forces into the Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC).

was in a strong position to have its concerns heard in case they ever were serious. In a move that surprised all analysts, however, the Congolese and Rwandan governments managed to convince the military leadership of the CNDP to cooperate with them and dislodged Laurent Nkunda. To secure that deal Rwandan troops were invited to North Kivu to keep the CNDP at bay and to start joint operations against the Hutu rebels of the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (Democratic Liberation Forces fo Rwanda—FDLR). At the time of writing (May 2009), Rwandan troops have largely pulled out again and it remains entirely unclear how the political landscape of North Kivu will look like in the months and years to come.

As long as interests and concerns of the different social groups in the region are not effectively addressed and a negotiated solution is sought, there will be no peace in North Kivu. Many Tutsis fear extinction and want to preserve their economic advantages acquired in the last decade. Nande and Hunde crave the political and economic spoils they have not been able to enjoy until now. The Hutu population fears revenge by Tutsis and Rwanda. And this is only the superficial version. The challenges by far exceed the simplistic ethnic categorization of the conflict. Land rights, the basis of the rural economy in North Kivu, have been contested for decades because even the authoritarian Mobutist state was unable to control the entire territory. Any solution will have to find suitable answers to this that are acceptable for all. Moreover, citizenship rights were awarded and withdrawn in a highly unpredictable fashion. Ensuring predictability and stability in this realm is equally essential. Unfortunately, only a state with a legitimate monopoly on violence is able to do this. And this is exactly what they fight for in North Kivu. Root causes and the solutions sought are inextricably intertwined. This complex web of problems will need smart ideas and strong leadership to be untangled.

Thanks to this complex political context, the humanitarian situation in North Kivu is extremely difficult. Malnutrition and child mortality rates are high and about 1 million people are internally displaced. Recent fighting created a situation of insecurity that will render economic and agricultural activities more difficult and contribute to a worsening of the health situation. Apart from the need to equip or build health centers to contain diseases like Cholera in Rutshuru and to improve water and sanitation systems, North Kivu is in dire need of roads and streets. Reaching many of the inner areas of the region is only possible by airplane. Local trade is severely restricted because of a lack of transport capacities and roads. Road blocks during fighting make regional goods exchange even more expensive or prevent it altogether.

The biggest challenge for humanitarians in North Kivu is access. Humanitarian convoys are frequently attacked and their supplies stolen. This insecure environment not only poses significant challenges for humanitarians but also for the development side. This is a particularly challenging environment for effective LRRD promotion, but a situation in which more long-term activities could yield a considerable peace dividend.

The LRRD Conception-Practice Paradox in North Kivu

The interviews in Goma, Kinshasa, Brussels and Washington D.C. revealed that explanations for the core difference between the development and the humanitarian logic abound. However, the overarching objective of both humanitarian and development assistance is to

support populations that need it. This common objective is rarely cited. Instead, representatives refer to their differences. An ECHO official stated that humanitarian assistance deals with *vulnerability* and focuses on the *individual* while development assistance aims to fight *poverty* and focuses on the *community*. An OFDA official agreed that humanitarian assistance deals with *vulnerability* and saw development focusing on the *viable*. In addition, humanitarian assistance replaced *extraordinary state-functions* while development assistance took over or supported *ordinary state functions*. Because of these differences the link between relief, rehabilitation and development was “*not really viable but necessary*,” said an OCHA representative, a statement which underlines nicely the paradox and complexity of that conceptual conundrum: It does not really work, but it should be followed.

Although presented as dichotomies all these terms are interconnected. Vulnerability often depends on poverty, the individual is part of a community and viability is not opposed to vulnerability, it rather refers to utility and feasibility while vulnerability is the description of the state of an individual. But the crucial part of the statements made by both European Commission and U.S. officials is not necessarily what they see as the difference but the fact that they construct a clear difference without acknowledging the links at the conceptual level. This is, of course, not a new observation. The clear separation gets blurred if humanitarians become interested in societal change. The OECD stated already in 2006: “Like other donors, [the U.S.] has also been considering the relative merits of “traditional” as opposed to “activist” approaches to humanitarian action. Whereas the former emphasizes neutrality and impartiality, the latter seeks to address underlying causes of humanitarian crises, such as conflict, and is prepared to take sides to achieve other goals, such as improving medium-term security.”³

The author of this case study thinks that in times of increased social engineering through UN peace-building and connected state-building, the activist approach is the more pragmatic and feasible one. Given the presence of UN troops in many of today’s protracted crises and the level of service provision by the international community compared to that of the home state, it seems like wishful thinking that some parts of the international community can pose as neutral and impartial. All are part of a large scale exercise in preventing humanitarian crises from getting worse and supporting an absent state. In the local context, this comes very close to replacing it and seems more in keeping with the activist than the traditionalist approach to humanitarian action.

On the practical level of LRRD promotion all interviewees have cited numerous road rehabilitation or health centre projects that were handed over from ECHO or OFDA funding to the European Commission European Development Fund, to USAID development funding or other donors from the development realm like DFID. Hand-over is not exactly what LRRD calls for. It calls for simultaneity and complementarity where feasible. But there are obvious links and examples for cooperation that could be extended.

³ OECD (2006), DAC Peer-Review USA, p. 81. Paris.

The Strategic and Institutional Frameworks for LRRD Promotion in DRC

Both the European Commission and the United States Government have produced a wealth of strategies and policies on crisis management, conflict prevention, early recovery, transition, stabilization and the relief, rehabilitation and development nexus trying to come to terms with protracted crises in fragile states such as the DRC. This is the strategic context the LRRD debate takes place in.

These fragile state strategies are frequently revised—sometimes at yearly intervals. An OFDA official complained that USAID is currently in a state of strategy chaos. European Commission officials were not as explicit but considerable contradictions in their core guidance exist. Both the European Commission and the U.S. have not explained clearly what they mean by separate humanitarian and development approaches and what this means for “grey area” activities.⁴ This leads to confusion when tackling the calls for integration and simultaneous separation in various strategic documents.

For the U.S. this debate is less important because the Bush Administration was very clear about its strategic national interests. Although endowed with considerable independence it was never in question that OFDA is also serving that same administration. Since the European Commission as the supranational body for 27 European Union member states only has a limited leverage in foreign assistance, and none in military affairs, the question of national interests and of politicization of assistance has to be approached differently. The European Commission wants to add value to the global perception of the European Union by posing as a *civil power*, a rather benevolent actor on the world stage. As development and humanitarian assistance are some of its main tools to promote that image it becomes understandable that conceptual fights are fought so ferociously within the European Commission.

Strategic shifts are often accompanied or followed by institutional changes. The following chapter thus describes the institutional set-up of LRRD promotion between Goma, Kinshasa, Brussels and Washington D.C. The DRC is among the most important receivers of development and humanitarian assistance worldwide. Not only are large sums of funds disbursed to support the pacification and democratization process, it has also been a laboratory of humanitarian reform. The DRC was a pilot country for the Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative (GHD), which the European Commission subscribes to and the U.S. co-chairs, the Cluster Approach, the newly established Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and the pooled fund mechanisms.⁵ As these reforms were mainly driven by the UN, both the U.S. and the European Commission have not invested heavily in them and stayed clear of too much delegation of authority to multilateral coordination mechanisms, at least at the global level.

The European Commission

The European Commission has made efforts to clarify the roles and responsibilities of its humanitarian and development services but its institutional set-up remains as complex as its strategic guidance. It is important to know that, similar to the U.S. Missions from 2004 on, the

⁴ See LRRD framework Chapter 8 for more details.

⁵ http://ochaonline.un.org/ocha2006ar/html/part3_democratic.html, last accessed: 14 May 2009.

European Commission has engaged in a de-concentration process transferring authority for funding decisions, programming and contracting to its country Delegations. This process, however, only concerns DG Development, DG Relations Exterieures (RELEX) and DG Aidco. DG ECHO does not participate and operates largely independently from the European Union Delegation. This is not conducive to joint LRRD assessments or planning.

In 2006, the European Commission engaged in a large-scale reorganization of its development and foreign policy instruments. Some were merged, new ones created and some stayed the same.⁶ It has now at its disposal, among others, the Development Cooperation Instrument, the Instrument of Stability, the Food Security Thematic Programme, and the intergovernmental European Development Fund in its A- and B-envelopes. The latter can be used for non-programmable and thus humanitarian funding.

One year before that, the revised 2005 Cotonou Accord established a complex system for European Commission development assistance including the European Development Fund B-envelope. It is based on the cooperation between a National Authorizing Officer (usually the Minister of Finance or a replacement which was assigned by him) and the European Commission Head of Delegation: The European Union draws up a Country Strategy Paper (CSP) for six years which is then signed into a National Indicative Program (NIP) after joint consultations between European Commission and the DRC government.⁷

Under the Development Cooperation Instrument two thematic programs are used in DRC: the aforementioned Food Security Thematic Program and the Non-State Actors—Local Authorities Thematic Program with € 1.25 million in funding.

Stabilization of situations of fragility has also become a priority for the European Commission. It thus created the Instrument for Stability, managed by DG RELEX. Like the Development Cooperation Instrument it is part of the Common Budget. The Instrument for Stability has a short-term and a long-term component. Although the Instrument for Stability strategy paper of 2007 states that a clear distinction can be made between the Instrument for Stability, the European Development Fund, Development Cooperation Instrument and ECHO funds, this remains in doubt. The strategy stresses that the Instrument for Stability will only be used in “the post-crisis early recovery phase (as opposed to the more immediate humanitarian relief phase).”⁸ Obviously, this is a hard distinction to make and a hotly debated topic especially in the context of LRRD. A difference in strategy, however, lies in its focus on capacity building of regional and international actors in contrast to ECHO activities in improving preparedness at the national level. € 18.5 million have been allocated for the DRC for 2006-2008.

The 2008 ECHO Global Plan for DRC amounts to €30 million plus €10 million in food assistance from the newly acquired short-term food-assistance budget line. This Global Plan is used in situations of protracted crises where a longer ECHO presence is foreseeable. ECHO has been present in DRC since 1997. Just as in 2005, 2006 and 2007, in the case of a deterioro-

⁶ See chapters 1,3, and 8 for more on this.

⁷ The current CSP valid from 2008 to 2013 is available at: http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/scanned_cd_csp10_fr.pdf, last accessed 14 May 2009.

⁸ http://ec.europa.eu/europeassistance/where/worldwide/stability-instrument/documents/ifs_strategy_2007-2011_en.pdf, 3 last accessed 14 May 2009.

Table 1. For all 2008 DRC operations according to ECHO, the European Commission has pledged the following funds:

ECHO	EU Delegation
Global Plan 2008: €30 million	European Development Fund (Env.-A programmable; 9th European Development Fund): €388 million (2003–2007)
Food Aid: €13,3 million	European Development Fund (Env.-B non programmable 9th European Development Fund): €100 million (2003–2007)
ECHO Flight (special flight service for humanitarian assistance in eastern DRC: €8 million	Food Security: €23 million (2007–2013) Instrument for Stability: €18.5 million (2006–08)

rating humanitarian situation this amount will be complemented by additional funds stemming either from the regular European Commission humanitarian assistance budget, the emergency reserve (globally at €239 million for 2008) or the B-Envelope of the European Development Fund in its national or regional version. It has to be noted, that ECHO focuses its current activities on the southern part of North Kivu (“Petit Nord”). In 2006 and 2007 it had limited activities in North Kivu and focused on the Ituri area north of North Kivu.

The challenge to promote good LRRD outcomes remains. Even thinking about a link between humanitarian and development assistance, let alone creating one, is as complicated for the European Commission as it is for the U.S. The newly established Food Security Thematic Program would be an opportunity to do so but its use has been erratic. It is designed for longer-term food-security programs and is administered by Delegation staff in Kinshasa and ultimately at DG Aidco in Brussels. It disbursed €11 million in the DRC in 2007 but will fund a similar amount in 2008.⁹

Adding the multi-year allocations of the Delegation and breaking them down to yearly allocations leads to an expenditure of €54.7 million for the year 2008. ECHO arrives at €51.3 million—a considerable amount, as all activities focus on the East while the development side is active in many parts of the country.¹⁰

Both the European Commission Delegation and ECHO in Goma underlined the fact that humanitarian assistance spends seven to ten times more per beneficiary.¹¹ On a very basic level this already points to the fact that not all humanitarian activities can be complemented or fol-

⁹ The European Commission (2008) Annual Action Program covered by the Programming Document “Thematic Strategy Paper and Multi-Annual Indicative Program 2007-2010” for the Development Cooperation Instrument in favour of Food Security for 2008 does not mention this number but interviewees confirm that the European Commission Delegation continues to use the FSTP in 2008.

¹⁰ The calculation is rather complex and not very exact. Of the A-envelope funds 160 million were used for debt repayments, so were not invested in development programs and thus taken out of the equation. The remaining funds were divided by seven because they include additional funds extending the timeframe until 2009. The B-envelope funds largely stem from the additional funds granted through the 2005 mid-term review (65 of 100 million) and also extend until 2009. That sum was thus also divided by seven instead of five.

¹¹ ECHO talked about 7 euros per beneficiary at ECHO and 1 euro at the development side. The Delegation mentioned 8 euros at ECHO and 0.8 at the Delegation.

lowed up by the development side. There are financial restrictions and humanitarian assistance is much more capital intensive.

The United States

In contrast to the United Kingdom, which channels most of its humanitarian assistance to the DRC through the UN-managed Pooled Fund (\$58 million in 2008 according to OCHA's Financial Tracking System), both the European Commission and the U.S. have preferred to fund bilaterally. In addition to this, the U.S. Government disburses large sums of development assistance to the DRC. The U.S. Department of State and USAID have jointly asked Congress for \$105 million in 2008 and \$95 million in 2009 for operations in the DRC,¹² excluding humanitarian assistance because this is requested on a short-term basis.

Apart from their similar importance with regards to both humanitarian and development funds, the European Commission and the U.S. face several institutional challenges to effective LRRD promotion: In the U.S., three Departments and one Agency are involved in the provision of humanitarian and development assistance: The Department of State, the Government Agency USAID whose Head, Henrietta Fore is also Director of Foreign Assistance under the Secretary of State, the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Defense.¹³

According to the December 2007 DRC report by the Government Accountability Office, State and USAID accounted for 80 percent of all U.S. assistance to the DRC in the years 2006–2007.¹⁴ This 80 percent consisted of 44 percent of humanitarian assistance (“emergency assistance”) and 36 percent development assistance (“non emergency assistance”).¹⁵ Food assistance is managed by the Office of Food for Peace (FFP), a part of USAID's Bureau of Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance. The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), however, has the overall lead on humanitarian assistance. It is also part of the Bureau of Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance and deals mainly with non-food humanitarian assistance. According to U.S. data,¹⁶ their non-food humanitarian activities in DRC cost \$18.3 million in financial year 2008. Food assistance amounted to \$71 million. \$69 million went to the UN World Food Program (WFP).

The newly established Bureau of Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance Office for Military Affairs, the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation and the Office for Transition Initiatives (OTI) do also play a role in DRC—but in more stable areas. The OTI is “helping local partners advance peace and democracy in priority countries in crisis. Seizing critical windows of opportunity, OTI works on the ground to provide fast, flexible, short-term assistance targeted at key political transition and stabilization needs.”¹⁷ After helping to organize the elections the Office for Transition Initiatives has quit operations in DRC in 2006.

¹² U.S. (2008) Congressional Budget Justification 2009, p. 212.

¹³ This excludes small-sale activities in the DRC by the Department of Labour, Department of Health, the Treasury and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, See GAO 2008 for more.

¹⁴ GAO (2007), p. 13.

¹⁵ It would of course be interesting to see how they have delineated the two.

¹⁶ USAID (2008) OFDA DRC Situation Report November 2008.

¹⁷ http://www.usassistance.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/transition_initiatives/, last accessed: 14 May 2009.

Despite carrying the name “transition”, the office has a very limited mandate, a very “political” one as one USAID interviewee put it. Elections were held, so their task was fulfilled. For them, the DRC had turned into a post-conflict country.

The Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation works in “Ituri, South Kivu, Maniema and Katanga provinces. The objectives of the programs include promotion of social cohesion and reconciliation through community-driven reconstruction, building local capacity for decision-making and conflict resolution [...]”¹⁸ The remaining funds are disbursed by the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration under the authority of the State Department. The Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration has a refugee protection mandate and deals with returning refugees mostly in the provinces of Equateur, South Kivu and Katanga.¹⁹ It spent \$34 million in financial year 2008. According to a Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration official they “also provided \$50.7 million to UNHCR and \$39.7 million to the ICRC for their Africa wide programs (un-earmarked).”²⁰ These funds are increasingly used for IDPs, as the UNHCR has started to deal with them. This creates a certain degree of overlap with OFDA.

An institutionally relevant novelty among the U.S. foreign assistance structure is the creation of the Office of the State Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. Drawing staff from both State and USAID it is tasked to “prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife so they can reach a sustainable path towards peace, democracy and a market economy.”²¹ It is building up a Civilian Response Corps, funded with \$248.6 million in FY 2009, tasked to complement (or, in practice, replace) the OFDA Disaster Assistance Response Teams and the military in post-conflict settings. When asked about the stabilization staff, an OFDA official replied: “We think they are coming. But nobody knows what they are doing.”

This institutional setup is replicated in the U.S. mission structure. The U.S. mission in Kinshasa hosts staff from OFDA, Food for Peace and the USAID Africa Bureau. OFDA has two permanent staff in the U.S. Mission in DRC who separate their time between Goma and Kinshasa. Goma is the base for their activities in Eastern DRC. Although OFDA has been active in North Kivu since the beginning of the refugee crisis after the Rwandan genocide in 1994 it still considers its activities as a response to an “extraordinary situation.” The Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration has no field office in the DRC. It assesses needs and situations from its regional office in Kampala.²² Food for Peace channels most of its funds through WFP. The responsible officer in the U.S. mission in Kinshasa travels around the country to oversee food assistance delivery. According to the interviewees, however, Food for Peace exerts less project oversight than OFDA and it is less involved in implementation.

Being part of the overall USAID and U.S. Mission structure, the humanitarian and the development side are institutionally connected: “USAID/DRC has the overall development

¹⁸ http://www.usassistance.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/conflict/support/afr.html, last accessed: 14 May 2009.

¹⁹ BPRM interviewee.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ <http://www.state.gov/s/crs/66427.htm>, last accessed: 14 May 2009.

²² BPRM official.

assistance relationship with the DRC and is the primary office implementing projects using funding allowed to our mission under various accounts (DA, CSH, ESF²³). Our humanitarian offices, OFDA and Food for Peace, conduct analyses to determine whether that assistance is required. The Ambassador must declare a disaster and request humanitarian assistance in order to allow for these offices to provide assistance.”²⁴ However, OFDA and Food for Peace retain a certain degree of autonomy because most of their funding decisions are made by their headquarters in Washington D.C..²⁵

LRRD Programs and Activities in North Kivu

Taking into account the strategic and institutional challenges concerning LRRD at Headquarters and in the field structure, it is now possible to approach the core of our research question: “*to what extent can the European Commission and the U.S., as the most important donors of humanitarian and development assistance, promote good LRRD outcomes at the field-level?*” To tackle it, what European Commission and U.S. do on the ground and how this may be connected to the frameworks described above will be scrutinized.

There are three types of obstacles to effective LRRD promotion: first conceptual issues which guide the thinking of the involved, second budgetary because rigid budget lines prevent flexibility and third, contractual when contracting procedures are time-consuming. How these three factors play out in North Kivu will be shown below.

The European Commission

European Commission action in Goma, North Kivu, is managed from an European Commission technical assistance office at Mount Goma and an ECHO office near the UN OCHA office at the main road. They previously shared the ECHO office, a practice that was recently suspended. Although both heads of office displayed mutual appreciation, both acknowledged that they did not talk very much.²⁶ The European Commission office is staffed with two consultants, a few local assistants and drivers, but for security reasons, no official European Commission staff. The ECHO office consists of a head of office and a Congolese deputy plus a similar amount of local support staff.²⁷

Given the fluidity of the conflict situation in North Kivu and the level of humanitarian needs this is not a robust field presence. Both ECHO and the European Commission Delegation have a dilemma of choosing to be either a secluded donor in capital missions or in European Headquarters, or an active one with a substantial field presence enabling more informed decision-making which consumes considerable funds. On the one hand, choosing the DFID

²³ These are congressional budget accounts: DA = Development Assistance, CSH = Child Support and Health, ESF = Economic Support Fund.

²⁴ USAID official.

²⁵ USAID official.

²⁶ Interviews with European Union officials and consultants.

²⁷ ECHO contracting policies say that ECHO field staff do not become European Commission staff but are individual contractors. This may be another reason for the lack of cooperation between ECHO and the other delegations. They have different backgrounds and varying career aspirations.

way of channeling all its funds through the UN Pooled Fund would require more trust in the UN and accepting less visibility in the field. On the other, the existence of several big donors with different procedures comes closer to a “competitive humanitarian assistance market” and might allow a little more flexibility. In interviews, some NGOs have expressed their gratitude that the European Commission and the U.S. stay clear of the all-encompassing UN approach because they were slightly less bureaucratic than the UN.

Nevertheless, LRRD-promotion requires substantial field knowledge. And the UN is no more attuned to LRRD than the European Commission and the U.S. are. If the RELEX family (DG DEV, Aidco and RELEX—without ECHO) is to become more flexible and willing to take risks it needs to be able to gauge situations and needs. Otherwise it will not dare to take these risks for fear of critical auditing. For ECHO to become more strategic, it needs the capacity and time to develop strategic approaches in concert with the rest of the Delegation. Without a substantial field presence, this is clearly not feasible. The current Delegation approach is to contract consulting institutes to develop LRRD strategies and programming and to have the field work done by consultants on short-term contracts. This lack of permanent institutional knowledge was exacerbated by the fact that in the case of drafting the Eastern DRC LRRD program “l’équipe mise sur le terrain ne comportait pas de spécialiste des assistances d’urgence.”²⁸ Because of this, the LRRD program was not a step forward in bringing humanitarian and development perspectives and approaches together to achieve better pragmatic solutions for the people in need.

According to one of their staff members, ECHO’s general areas of funding are “food security, road rehabilitation, food assistance, health, protection, water and sanitation actions in favor of IDPs, returnees and repatriated refugees and medical and nutritional emergency responses to outbreaks and malnutrition crises.”²⁹ Although in times of acute crisis it might appear that this work has to be done so quickly that all strategic discussions will cost lives, one has to keep in mind that very similar humanitarian needs in North Kivu have occurred for the last 14 years. It would yield considerable results to invest in strategic capacity and institutional knowledge about the recurring patterns of need. Despite urgent needs, some ECHO staff will have to be allowed to sit down and strategize, especially in the field where the local dynamics can be understood. This would turn ECHO into a donor that is able to focus more on strategic dialogue with development donors.

The European Commission Delegation LRRD program

The LRRD program for Eastern DRC called “Réhabilitation et réintégration socio-économique après la guerre” was set up in 2002 and is entirely funded from the 9th European Development Fund B-Envelope allocation to the DRC³⁰ and thus managed by the Delegation.

²⁸ European Union (2007) Evaluation de la Stratégie de Coopération de la Commission Européenne avec la République Démocratique du Congo, p. 92.

²⁹ Interview ECHO official.

³⁰ From 1992 to 2001, the European Commission had suspended most development assistance to the DR Congo to exert pressure on the Mobutu and consecutive Laurent Kabila regimes. After the Sun City talks in 2002 fully-fledged cooperation resumed. Until then, only ECHO had been operating in the country, trying to tackle the direst humanitarian needs. Starting with a few projects taken over from ECHO, 6th to 8th EDF funds were used mostly in infrastructure, health and agricultural rehabilitation. In addition, the NGO co-financing budget line was used.

Despite the wealth of LRRD guidance stemming from Headquarters which point at the need to cooperate with ECHO, this program had little to do with ECHO. Links were established neither on the institutional nor on the operational level. In short: This program is an example of the development side engaging in LRRD without taking the humanitarian side into account. ECHO was not very interested in being taken into account either.

The LRRD program consists of two phases. The first program contained €26.9 million that were disbursed and used quickly starting in 2002. The second was signed in 2006 and contains €65 million which in 2008 were complemented by another €10 million from the regional European Development Fund B-Envelope. This program is ambitious and is an important test-case for the European Commission's capacity in LRRD-promotion. It is also a test-case for the ability of the RELEX family in Brussels and the Delegation in Kinshasa to work with ECHO and vice versa.

The cycle of European Commission development program execution starting with the signing of the financing convention is usually divided into three phases: 1) a phase of contracting, 2) a phase of operations and 3) a closing phase. The first part of the LRRD program focused on the rehabilitation of infrastructure, of schools and water supply and on agricultural production support. All rehabilitation activities were complemented by capacity building. According to the 2007 evaluation of European Commission development activities in DRC, this first program worked in an efficient manner as it provided quick and flexible funding to NGOs that had previously worked with ECHO funds and is a good example of successful hand-over. The financing convention was signed in 2003 which launched the execution cycle. The end of the contracting phase was set for end of 2006 and the end of the operations phase for 2008.

The second part, however, got slowed down by administrative problems and the need for extensive preliminary studies and proceeded so slowly that linking it to fast-paced humanitarian assistance became hard to achieve.

Between 2002 and 2008 the European Commission had a consultant in either Bunia (in Ituri, north of North Kivu) or in Goma and for a short period of time in both cities. Unfortunately, there was a lot of staff turn over which turned contracting and the search for partners into an even more difficult process. The second part of the LRRD program prioritizes the infrastructure sector to which it allocated € 41.5 of the € 75 million total funds. The remaining funds are to go to the health sector, capacity building, economic recovery and to town and country planning. The phase of operations, however has only recently started. About half of the funds have been disbursed. Realistically, the closing date of the program was thus set as the end of 2013. According to a member of the European Commission Delegation, all contracts were signed until October 2008.

Given the fact that the LRRD program has only been partly implemented until now, it is difficult to gauge the extent of cooperation and linking between ECHO and Delegation activities. As indicated above, the lack of communication at the field level, however, is acknowledged by both. What seems to have worked well was the hand-over of a few ECHO activities through the first part of the LRRD program. But the second program's execution was so slow that any kind of cooperation with ECHO was hard to achieve. Timeliness is one of the key requirements of humanitarian assistance. Waiting for a partner that takes several years to start

disbursing funds and have partners launch their activities is rather unthinkable for a humanitarian donor.

The on-and-off nature of ECHO's humanitarian assistance in North Kivu is another obstacle to cooperation. In 2006 and 2007, the ECHO office in Goma was mostly concerned with Ituri and North Kivu was considered stable and in less need (just as South Kivu is regarded as stable now). When fighting started at the end of 2007 and intensified in the course of 2008, ECHO shifted its activities back to North Kivu. For the North Kivu parts of the LRRD program that meant there was not much to link to.

Furthermore, there are deficiencies of the LRRD program at the conceptual level. Its strategic direction was drafted by consultants with little knowledge of humanitarian affairs. This led to a serious disconnect between ECHO activities and the LRRD program. In this program officially aimed at linking the two realms, "la notion d'urgence a disparu."³¹ With no knowledge about the requirements of humanitarian assistance in a protracted crisis situation like North Kivu, the program design followed the officially outdated *continuum* logic.³² It separated the program cycle into two phases: One to deal with the link between relief and rehabilitation and the following phase to deal with the link between rehabilitation and development. Continuous simultaneity thinking was completely absent. With such disregard for strategic efforts made among the European Commission the effective promotion of LRRD becomes all but impossible. Although initial cooperation and follow-up between ECHO and the RELEX family existed particularly in infrastructure, these practical efforts were not elevated to the programmatic and conceptual level.

Although ECHO officially bought into LRRD thinking, it was probably satisfied that they did not have to spend too much time to liaise with the LRRD program. Given their day-to-day activities and their level of staffing, real cooperation would have been hard to achieve. In addition, it would have compromised their independence. They would have engaged in tackling root causes, in crisis management. This is, according to the European Commission Humanitarian Consensus, not what humanitarian assistance is about.³³

Examples of Cooperation

Despite the lack of staff and conceptual clarity, in some sectors LRRD promotion would be feasible. The most LRRD-prone assistance sectors in North Kivu appear to be infrastructure, health and food security. Infrastructure because it is rather straightforward to find a road to rehabilitate that both humanitarian and development actors deem useful for their activities. Similarly, health centers may be serviced by both at the same time. Humanitarians may provide free health services while development is funding nurse and doctor training or large anti-malaria campaigns. The creation of a health system which is the aim of the European Commission Envelope-A health component does not have to be designed in a way that is completely contradictory to prior ECHO activities. Integrated food security interventions would not focus

³¹ European Union (2007) Evaluation de la Stratégie de Coopération de la Commission Européenne avec la République Démocratique du Congo, p. 92.

³² For more on the continuum-contiguuum debate see LRRD framework Chapter 8.

³³ For more on this, please see LRRD Framework Chapter 8.

on direct in-kind food assistance which ECHO usually contents itself with, but rather on market support or cash-for-work programs.

In order to illustrate the possibility of improved cooperation, the following example describes a few details on a *continuum* cooperation in road rehabilitation between ECHO and the Delegation that seemed to work well initially but suffered in the long run from the lack of strategic cooperation right from the start between the German Welthungerhilfe as the implementing agency, the initial funders ECHO and the Delegation which took over with its B-Envelope. Strategizing jointly from the start would be a big step towards promoting LRRD.

Project Example: Road Rehabilitation Walikale–Masisi–Sake

The most prominent example of practical cooperation took place in the case of the rehabilitation of the Walikale–Masisi–Sake road which is still a highly controversial topic today. According to the first implementing agency, the German NGO Welthungerhilfe, it started rehabilitating the road in 1998 with its own funds.³⁴ In 2000, ECHO started funding, in 2002 the LRRD program (the first phase of it, see above), and the RELEX family stepped in. Since 2004, the funds come from the European Development Fund A-Envelope. As this road is important for economic, military and humanitarian purposes it was not a very controversial decision for all actors to fund it. Humanitarians needed it to access vulnerable populations and the development side sought to facilitate trade, create jobs in construction and reinvigorate agriculture in the surrounding areas. MONUC or the FARDC (Forces Armée de la RDC) used it for military campaigns.

Today, however, Welthungerhilfe has discontinued its work on this project because it is protesting against the measures undertaken by the Provincial Governor Julien Paluku Kahongya. According to them, he has replaced the local committees servicing the road and repairing it when needed with his cronies which had led to its decay. As a reaction to this, Welthungerhilfe would expect the European Commission delegation to pressurize Julien Paluku Kahongya and make all further funds conditional on not interfering politically in the process. Both ECHO and the European Commission Delegation, however, have a different vision of this. The European Commission Delegation regards the roads chosen by Welthungerhilfe as strategically badly placed. According to them, the terrain and the trade routes were not studied thoroughly before starting to build the roads. This makes them reluctant to continue investing heavily in this project. ECHO, by contrast, regards Welthungerhilfe regulations as too bureaucratic and inflexible and has stopped funding their activities altogether.

Road rehabilitation could clearly be an avenue of enhanced European Commission LRRD promotion in North Kivu. In the future, the Delegation could contribute to commissioning more feasibility studies and ECHO could contribute their knowledge on fast-track contracting. This would require serious analytical cooperation, however.

ECHO's (and OFDA's) main concern is access to vulnerable populations. This access needs to be found quickly to reach those in need. The Delegation, by contrast, is more interested in

³⁴ Interview with Welthungerhilfe official.

the long-term sustainability of the road, its contribution to strengthened internal market and trade operations and the number of jobs created through it. Strategic cooperation would involve a mapping exercise of probable displacement areas in case of renewed conflict, economic activities there and the connected state of the infrastructure. After identifying both of these humanitarian and development concerns one could separate the funding and programing tasks according to respective priorities and ensure that they complement each other.

According to an OCHA official, the rehabilitation of roads in non-stable situations involves higher financial and personal risks, but also promises huge benefits: First, work on roads injects cash into the economy and, second, reduces the number of “spoilers”, as becoming a soldier becomes less interesting. In addition, fighting between the rebel Congrè National du Peuple (CNDP) and the FARDC and its militia allies usually took place on the axis Masisi—Sake (a part of the road described above). Now that this part of the road is being repaired by UNOPS (which replaced Welthungerhilfe) fighting has stopped. Fighters were at pains not to destroy the road. This is possibly because neither the CNDP nor the FARDC can afford to infuriate the 1000 to 3000 people working on that road. They also have to keep in mind those businesspeople profiting from the improved road for trading and smuggling purposes. Thus, investing in infrastructure that is useful for varying interest groups might be a viable development investment even in crisis contexts. And humanitarians are also in desperate need of a road in order to have better roads to access the internally displaced. The alternative of delivering assistance by plane is not the cheapest and most effective method of assistance delivery.

Contracting Procedures

One of the main particularities of the LRRD program is that it allows accelerated contracting procedures which has worked relatively well. Envelope-B regulations in the ANNEX IV, Article 25 of the revised Cotonou Accord say: “Contracts under emergency assistance shall be undertaken in such a way as to reflect the urgency of the situation. To this end, for all operations relating to emergency assistance, the ACP State may, in agreement with the Head of Delegation, authorize: (a) the conclusion of contracts by direct agreement; (b) the performance of contracts by direct labor; (c) implementation through specialized agencies; and (d) direct implementation by the Commission.”³⁵

This provision was used to contract NGOs that were on a shortlist because they had either previously worked with the RELEX family or had worked with ECHO in DRC before. As a result, humanitarian NGOs such as SODERU, Première Urgence, Action Contre la Faim or ACTED were considered for implementation of the LRRD program alongside more development oriented organizations such as the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, UNDP, the German Technical Cooperation or the Coopération Technique Belge.³⁶

Crucially, this fast and non-bureaucratic procedure hinges on the permission of the ACP State and the Head of Delegation. As the European Commission has chosen to work with the National Authorizing Officer, secretary of finance Athanase Matenda Kyelu, and its apparatus

³⁵ Revised Cotonou Accord, ANNEX IV, Article 25.

³⁶ European Commission (2007) Avenant No. 1 a la Convention de Financement no 9520/ZR, p. 5.

on equal footing, the latter has, in theory, a substantial amount of ownership in the process and the possibility to direct European Development Fund funds in accordance with national development priorities. However, all international assistance workers interviewed in Goma and Kinshasa complained about the important role the Congolese officials play in this process. Unanimously, they call for more independent decision making, more rights to interfere, in short, open permission to replace the Congolese state as long as it is unable to fulfill its tasks in a timely and effective manner. According to them, on the one hand, the National Authorizing Officer office does not see the European Commission programs as their own programs and do not drive the process. On the other, they are so slow at processing contracts that it may take between nine to twelve months until one contract under the current LRRD program can be signed. For an LRRD program attuned to relief needs, this is of course a long time.³⁷

The personal priorities of the European Commission Head of Delegation are also important enabling or preventing factors of the use of accelerated procedures. The former Head of Delegation allowed the use of accelerated procedures and saw LRRD as a priority. The new Head of Delegation, is said to be more focused on anti-fraud measures and prefers not taking too many risks by using fast track procedures. Both approaches have their advantages, but it is important to note that the Cotonou Accord does leave the respective management considerable *marge de manoeuvre* in making NGO contracting more attuned to situations of protracted crisis.

Regarding companies,³⁸ however, the Accord is more restrictive. Work, supply and service contracts do have different financial thresholds which trigger international, national or local tender processes.³⁹ Pre-selections are not allowed.

The European Commission LRRD Analysis Framework

Despite the explicit LRRD program in Eastern DRC since 2002, the DRC was not included as one of the pilot countries of the new LRRD analysis framework pioneered in Chad, Sudan, Zimbabwe, East-Timor, North Korea and Afghanistan. This analysis framework drafted by DG Aidco aims at supporting joint situation analysis, needs analysis and the preparation of a consolidated response. Apart from a few gaps on governance, institutional aspects, security and the specific country context, this may constitute a constructive step into the direction of LRRD promotion. The key lesson learned from the testing was that “there is a need for greater clarity in specifying the final objective of the analysis framework.”⁴⁰ This is no surprise because the fundamental conceptual guidance is still contradictory.⁴¹ No clear solutions to the integration-separation challenge between humanitarian assistance and development assistance have been found to date, as shown above. The traditionalist current in humanitarian assistance

³⁷ Awarding the Congolese state such a prominent role in designing and managing the European funds and contracts was a political decision. One might speculate that financing elections, praising them and then not empowering the newly elected government might have questioned the European Commission optimism and counteracted large parts of the positive rhetoric still reigning back in 2006.

³⁸ For more on business engagement in humanitarian assistance see Chapter 13.

³⁹ Revised Cotonou Accord (2005), Annex IV, Article 23.

⁴⁰ European Union (2008). *Le Zoom de Rosa*, No.9, August 2008, p. 4.

⁴¹ See LRRD framework Chapter 8.

is still too strong to be able to streamline the activist approach into all activities. Wordings and explanations remain overly confusing and cannot instill a sense of direction among European Commission staff. In short: Without delineating what development and humanitarian assistance is and what it is not, no real progress will be made towards effective LRRD-promotion.

The United States

The U.S. humanitarian activities in North Kivu are managed by two OFDA staff who divide their time between Kinshasa and Goma. Another longstanding officer oversees the Food for Peace funds which are all channeled through the UN World Food Program. The USAID development side engages in a variety of activities in DRC. According to the U.S. Mission in Kinshasa, “approximately 65 percent of overall bilateral development assistance targets the Eastern provinces.” In contrast to the European Commission, there is no explicit relief to development program between OFDA and USAID. The Congressional Budget Justifications 2008 and 2009 show a shift in funding away from health and education to stabilization and security sector reform.

In interviews, the OFDA coordinator reported on a variety of activities that were now taken up by the development side of USAID, but argued that one should not assume a logical necessity of humanitarian work being taken over by development activities. In keeping with the conceptual separation, he underlined that they may have different objectives. Development looks for a viable option with the highest “return on investment”, while OFDA is responding to extra-ordinary needs in an effort to save lives. In January 2008, after the signing of the Goma accords the development side among USAID was eager to get started, but the renewed fighting prevented it. The “return on investment”-thinking leads to his conviction that the northern part of North Kivu (le grand nord) was ready for development work because the business-people there were so active. The prerequisite for linking relief to development is consistent interest from both sides (humanitarian and development) in the same sector. In the health sector, this was the case despite the recent reduction of funds. This is why OFDA was able to hand over a health center north of Beni to the USAID development side.

In infrastructure, hand-over or even outright simultaneous funding has yet to occur. USAID did not have any funds for infrastructure. According to OFDA, because of increased interest in stabilization, infrastructure may become an area of increased activity in the near future. Given the lack of clarity on institutional relations between the staff of the State Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization and the rest of USAID it will be interesting to follow the evolution of this sector.

According to OFDA, linking short term food-assistance and longer term activities to increase food security and agricultural production are hard to implement in North Kivu due to unsettled and complicated land rights issues. Without long-term access to land, agricultural development will remain unstable. Interviews at the UN World Food Program Goma pointed in another direction, however. According to them, agricultural production in the rural areas of Rutshuru and Walikale was so high that enabling market operations, providing them with bikes for transport and comparable activities may constitute a useful step towards increased

food security. A further point is that the soil there is so fertile that in kind food assistance was not necessary.

In contrast to OFDA, as indicated in the policy analysis,⁴² Food for Peace has a clear focus on LRRD. According to the Food for Peace officer in Kinshasa, “Food for Peace has three MYAP (Multi-Year Assistance Programs) from 2008-2011 worth about \$34 million dollars with Mercy Corps, Food for the Hungry International, and Africare/Adventist Development and Relief Agency in South Kivu, Northern Katanga and non-turbulent parts of North Kivu. These are meant to be a transition from the emergency to development. Meanwhile, we fund WFP for its emergency operations.”⁴³ This means that in this case Food for Peace acts as administrator of U.S. funds to both short-term and long-term food-security programs - a distinct difference to the partition of work seen in the European Commission and between OFDA and the USAID development side.

Food for Peace and OFDA staff at the DRC field level seem to cooperate well. OFDA sometimes steps in to support food assistance with logistics funds, for example if WFP is lacking airlift capacity. In exceptional cases, OFDA also provides food, but coordinates with Food for Peace beforehand. U.S. food assistance policy is criticized heavily internationally because of its origins in agricultural surplus disposal. The OECD reported in 2006 that George W. Bush wanted to increase the use of cash to buy food locally but was turned down by congress.⁴⁴

To contribute to establishing a more activist approach to humanitarian assistance, OFDA might consider developing Multi-Year Assistance Programs, too. Its 2006 “Guidelines for unsolicited proposals and reporting”⁴⁵ underline that projects in micro-finance cannot be supported because they usually only take effect after 18 months, while OFDA can only fund 12 months. These rigid funding borders are not conducive to LRRD promotion.

Conclusion

The analysis of European Commission and U.S. approaches to LRRD in DRC has shown how difficult its promotion is, particularly in a protracted crisis like North Kivu. A neat separation of tasks between the humanitarians at OFDA and ECHO and their development colleagues at USAID and the RELEX family clearly dominates in North Kivu. However, the U.S. seem to allow slightly more flexibility to its departments. The European Commission, by contrast, set up an ambitious LRRD program to allow more flexible programming but still struggles considerably with its compartmentalized assistance structure.

This study described a number of cases of hand-over between the two realms in the infrastructure and in health sectors but could not present a single case of simultaneous or complementary action that the *contiguuum* approach to LRRD calls for. This conclusion depends of

⁴² See LRRD framework Chapter 8.

⁴³ Interview with Food for Peace official.

⁴⁴ The agribusiness lobby keeps Food for Peace alive. Its progressive LRRD or “development-relief” policies may be a move to counter criticism.

⁴⁵ Available at: http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance/resources/pdf/updated_guidelines_unsolicited_proposals_reporting.pdf, last accessed: 14 May 2009.

course on a specific understanding of complementarity. In a sense USAID and OFDA actions are complementary: they both contribute to the well-being of numerous Congolese. In addition, ECHO and the RELEX family work simultaneously in the same country.⁴⁶

The real challenge, however, to create an immediate link between a specific activity in a limited area of operation is not met. The European Commission LRRD program has decided to fund a road office including staff and will likely remain for some time. A consolidation of peace is not yet in sight. The sophisticated European Commission A-Envelope sponsored establishment of a sustainable health system in collaboration with the provincial authorities has come to a halt because of renewed massive displacement away from recently set up health centers. ECHO's practice of free health services in response to the humanitarian crisis does not link to these activities. Food security interventions have unfortunately not been covered in this study but in a province as fertile as North Kivu it is safe to say that supporting market circulation of agricultural goods could be a substantial humanitarian contribution.

Thus, the evidence drawn from this case study points at two main avenues for LRRD improvement: First, fostering a *common understanding* of what a workable division of labor between humanitarians and development actors can be in light of LRRD requirements. Second, increasing joint situation and needs analysis and starting a pragmatic *results-oriented discussion at field level* where habitual practice in both realms could be changed to ensure better linking.

In a situation of a decade-long recurring conflict and resulting humanitarian assistance both ECHO and OFDA might consider investing more in *capacity strengthening*. Funding NGOs such as the International Medical Corps which is training Congolese nurses that are able to react to the pendulum and unexpected displacement movements triggered by renewed fighting, might constitute a genuine LRRD activity. Better trained doctors and water and sanitation specialists in North Kivu will also be able to contribute to the health system the development actors of both European Commission and the U.S. aim to support. This means that both ECHO and OFDA have to *invest more in finding humanitarian assistance activities that have both immediate and long-term impact*. In a one-time crisis or natural disaster situation, this obviously does not make sense. In contexts like North Kivu it clearly is an opportunity.

The development actors, on the other hand, cannot keep producing new and at times contradictory guidance about LRRD or relief to development without realizing what actual LRRD-promotion and implementation means. LRRD promotion means *investing in crisis contexts and taking risks*. It does not mean waiting until everything has calmed down and a return to conflict has become unlikely. Protracted pendulum situations are too complex to gauge. While South Kivu and Katanga may currently appear peaceful and thus ripe for development funds, this situation may drastically change in a few months. Development actors have to understand that their actions may actually contribute to ending conflict and yield considerable peace dividends. If this translates *into easing contracting procedures and speeding up decision making*, real LRRD-promotion may be in sight.

⁴⁶ This corresponds to the narrow definition of the contiguum presented in the LRRD framework Chapter 8.

